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Current Doha Development Agenda (DDA) World Trade Organisation negotiations include 
proposals that would affect the trade barriers that protect Canada’s chicken producers from 
foreign competition.  This research analyses the effects of the most recent proposals to emerge 
from the DDA negotiation on Canada’s chicken industry.  We develop a partial-equilibrium 
model that generates welfare effects for the Canadian chicken industry supply chain.  We also 
introduce stochastic prices to evaluate the effects of world price instability on the Canadian 
chicken industry.  The model is also adapted to represent chicken as two distinct products; white 
meat and dark meat.  Simulation results suggest that the welfare effects of the DDA proposals on 
the Canadian chicken industry would be small, providing that chicken receives the sensitive 
products designation.  Liberalisation leads to higher total welfare in the chicken industry, which 
is accounted for by consumer welfare that increases by a larger amount than producer welfare 







1.0 INTRODUCTION     
 
Canada’s chicken industry has operated under a system of supply management since 1979.  The 
supply-managed system is based on three pillars: production controls, a cost-of-production 
pricing formula and protection from relatively low-priced foreign products.  The combination of 
these pillars has led to relatively high chicken prices in Canada and resultantly high returns to 
chicken producers.   
 
Current World Trade Organisation (WTO) negotiations have included discussions on liberalising 
trade in agricultural products through, among other methods, lowering tariff barriers between 
member countries.  Canada’s chicken industry is currently protected by a tariff rate quota (TRQ), 
and could be affected by new rules on tariff barriers.  The TRQ that currently insulates the 
Canadian chicken industry from foreign competition is comprised of a low tariff on a small 
volume of imports and a prohibitively high tariff on imports above the defined minimum access 
level.  The most recent proposals to emerge from the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) 
negotiations indicate that TRQs that insulate Canada’s supply managed industries would be 
disciplined in two ways: first through an increase in the volume of imports allowable under the 
low tariff rate, and second through a reduction in the higher, over-quota, tariff rate.  Such 
disciplines could expose the Canadian chicken industry to more competition from foreign 
suppliers.   
 
We develop a partial equilibrium simulation model of the Canadian chicken industry in order to 
estimate the welfare effects of proposed WTO disciplines.  Up to date production, consumption 
and price data are used in combination with elasticities from other studies to develop a model 
that accommodates a range of trade policy scenarios and modelling strategies.  Welfare estimates 
are calculated along the chicken supply chain including producers, processors and consumers.  
The model is simulated under two different aggregation strategies: chicken as a single 
homogenous product, and a less restrictive version that treats chicken as two distinct products 
that are differentiated by cut.  We also introduce a stochastic element to international prices to 
simulate the effects of increased price risk on the Canadian chicken industry.   
 
The simulation results incorporate the most recent proposals to emerge from the DDA 
negotiations, and assume that chicken will receive the sensitive products designation.  This 
assumption is key to the results because such products would not be subjected to the same levels 
of tariff cuts as other agricultural products if a DDA deal is done.  We find that the current DDA 
proposals would have relatively small welfare effects on the Canadian chicken industry.   
Proposed cuts to over quota tariff rates would leave chicken tariffs prohibitively high, and the 
only effect on chicken imports would come through an increase in the minimum access 
commitment.  The net effect is an increase in total welfare, which is accounted for by an increase 
in consumer welfare that is larger than the decrease in producer welfare.  These results hold 
across modelling strategies, however the magnitudes of welfare effects are larger in the less 






2.0  OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN CHICKEN INDUSTRY 
 
The Canadian chicken industry has operated under a supply management system since 1979. 
Supply management is based on three pillars; import limits, production controls, and price 
determination. The supply of chicken is regulated using a production quota system, so that 
regulated chicken producers must hold production quota in order to produce and ship their 
product to the market. Producers pay fees for the right to produce, which implies that the 
production quota is a valuable asset. Producer prices are determined at the provincial level using 
a live-price cost of production formula that includes input costs (the price of chicks and feed) 
plus a producer margin. To maintain the stability of supply in Canada, the supply management 
system limits imported products. Chicken imports are divided into products that are on the 
Import Control List (ICL) (live chickens, eviscerated fresh and chilled or frozen chicken, 
processed and smoked chicken products) and products not on this list (TV dinners, soup, etc.). 
Chicken products that are on the ICL are subject to tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), while non-ICL 
products are not (AAFC, 2006).  
 
There are three components to a TRQ: a low duty rate (in-quota tariff), a minimum import access 
level for entry at that low tariff rate, and a higher tariff rate (over-quota tariff) for over-access 
imports. The in-quota tariff for chicken under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) is zero percent, and under the WTO agreement is 5% (Canada Border Service Agency, 
2009). The over-quota tariff rate for chicken is 238%. Under NAFTA, the annual import access 
for chicken is 7.5% of the previous year's domestic production, and under the WTO Agreement 
on Agriculture is 5% of domestic consumption. The minimum market access level is set to the 
higher limit between the levels negotiated under NAFTA and the WTO (i.e. 7.5% of the previous 
year's domestic production).  
 
The cost-of-production formula, production quotas, and import restrictions have driven Canadian 
chicken prices considerably higher than world prices, putting Canadian chicken processors who 
are willing to export at a disadvantage in the world market. However, since the Canadian chicken 
market is predominantly a white meat market (AAFC, 2006). Canadian processors have an 
opportunity to sell dark meat surplus on the international market. In order to compete, Canadian 
processors lower their export prices to the international level. Therefore, the value of Canadian 
chicken exports is much lower than the value of Canadian chicken imports, although the volumes 
are similar.  The average value of an import-unit of chicken (68.3% of which is white) is 
C$2.61/kg while the average value of an export-unit (84.4% of which is dark) is C$1.87/kg 
(AAFC, 2008).  The significant price difference between the products speaks to the 
heterogeneity of white and dark chicken meat.  
 
 
3.0 MODEL  SPECIFICATION 
 
3.1 Chicken  Representation 
 
Trade policy analyses of chicken markets have traditionally treated chicken as a single 
homogeneous product, regardless of production location or cut (Rude and Gervais, 2006; 
Peterson and Orden, 2004).  However, Huff et al. (2000) found that the pattern of Canadian  
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chicken consumption and trade suggested that chicken meat had become two differentiated 
products. Hence, they proposed differentiation by cut as an area for further research. 
 
A competitive partial equilibrium model with disaggregated high value (white meat) and low 
value (dark meat) cuts of chicken, and a country-of-origin differentiation has been studied in the 
context of sanitary measures (Peterson and Orden, 2004). Thompson et al. (2008) conducted 
research to analyze how three models that are based on three different representations of chicken 
(chicken as a single homogeneous good, as two homogeneous co-products, and as heterogeneous 
goods based on country of origin) respond to different external shocks and different trade policy 
scenarios. Thompson et al. (2008) found that responses in chicken production, consumption, and 
prices are similar across models when the shocks are not directly related to the chicken market 
(feed price shock, changes in income, or changes in substitute’s prices). The similarity across 
models disappears when considering changes that are specific to chicken markets.  
 
Given the patterns of Canadian chicken consumption and trade, we develop two simulation 
models in this research. One treats chicken as a single homogeneous product and the second 
represents chicken as two differentiated products (white meat and dark meat). The comparison of 
results from the more (single good) and the less (two-good) restrictive model provides insights 
into the methodological question of the importance of disaggregating chicken by cut.  
 
 
3.2 Price  Risk   
 
One of the core objectives of Canada’s supply managed system of pricing and production is price 
and income stability (Rude and Gervais, 2006).  The cost of production pricing formula adjusts 
to changing input prices, thereby stabilising producer incomes.  A new WTO agreement that 
would expose Canadian chicken producers to more international competition may subject 
Canadian producers to variable flows of imports and lead to more volatile prices and income.   
 
We introduce price risk into the model by allowing world prices to follow a stochastic process.  
Following Rude and Gervais (2006), a time-series of US chicken prices is used to find the best 
fitting probability distribution for the world price using the distribution fitting software 
BESTFIT. The time series data set is an 18-year series of monthly US prices (12-city composite 
wholesale price of chicken) plus a transportation cost (C$ 0.1/kg, CFC, 2009), converted to 
Canadian dollars. The best fitting distribution for the time series is a normal distribution with a 
mean of 1.75 and standard deviation of 0.25. The same procedure is followed to determine the 
appropriate probability distribution for the world price of white and dark meats when chicken is 
treated as two distinct products. In this case, time series data sets of monthly wholesale prices of 
breast (for white meat) and legs (for dark meat) are used.  The best fitting distribution for the 
world indicator price of white chicken meat is a normal distribution with a mean of 2.63 and 
standard deviation of 0.42. The world indicator price of dark chicken meat has a normal 





4.0  DATA AND SIMULATION MODEL 
 
4.1   Parameters and Data 
 
We impose the small country assumption on Canada in the simulation model.  Canadian exports 
account for just 2% of world chicken exports, compared to 38% for the US and 39% for Brazil 
(USDA, 2009).  In order to build the one-good model, the elasticities of demand and supply, and 
the farm-level marginal cost are required. The elasticity of demand is taken from an AAFC 
(2007) study. Moschini and Meilke (1991) note that published demand elasticities are typically 
estimated at the retail level, and therefore an assumption about the marketing margins is needed 
to analyse different stages of the supply chain (e.g. wholesale level). We assume a constant 
processing margin across output levels (Moschini and Meilke, 1991). An elasticity of supply of 
0.8 is assumed based on an estimate of US long-run broiler supply from Chavas (1978). 
Canadian chicken supply may be more elastic that US supply because of unused capacity at the 
farm level (Moschini and Meilke, 1991), so we conduct sensitivity analysis on this parameter in 
the simulations. Additional parameters are required to build the model that differentiates chicken 
by type of cut, such as the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand. Previously estimated 
own-price and cross-price elasticities calculated at the retail level are used. Table 1 lists the 
parameters used in the two models.  
 
Table 1: Parameters  
 
Canada  Chicken  White chicken   Dark chicken  




Price elasticity of demand  -0.7
b    
Own-price elasticity of demand    -1.47
c -0.93
c 




a  Chavas (1978)  
b AAFC (2007), 
c and Goddard et al. (2007). 
 
 
The data used to calibrate the model for the representation of chicken as a single homogeneous 
product correspond to national supply-disposition (USDA, 2009), based on an average from 
2004-2007.  The two-good model requires separate production, consumption, and trade data for 
purposes of calibration.  These data are not available in this form, so a mechanical process is 
used to generate data for the two-good model. Chicken production, consumption, and trade data 
are separated into white meat (chicken breasts) and dark meat (chicken legs). Chicken production 
is disaggregated based on an assumed chicken cut-out rate of 53.3% to 46.7% between white and 
dark meat (CFC, 2009). Following Thompson et al. (2008), the shares of white and dark meat as 
components of total chicken trade are estimated with traded prices of white and dark meats and 
the average price of all chicken trade. The shares of imports and exports of each type of meat are 






world white P Sh P Sh ATP * 1 * − + =  (1)   
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where  ATP is the average traded price,  white Sh  is the share of imports/exports of white meat, 
white
world P  represents the world indicator price of white meat, and 
dark
world P  is the world indicator price 
of dark meat.  The world price indicators are the average US wholesale price of breast for white 
meat and the average US wholesale price of legs for dark meat, plus a transportation cost of 
C$0.1/kg (CFC, 2009). The share of dark meat as a component of total trade is equal to 
white Sh − 1 . Consumption of each type of meat is calculated as the residual of the market clearing 
balance.   
 
 
4.2 Simulation  Model 
 
4.2.1  Demand: One-good Model 
 
The model is built around a linear wholesale domestic demand function for chicken and a linear 
farm-level domestic supply function that is subject to production controls.  The inverse demand 







P   (2) 
 
whereP  is the domestic price, D is domestic demand, 
wholesale P
Qd η
δ = ,  ) ( η γ − = 1 Qd ,  wholesale P  is 
the observed wholesale price
1, Qd  is the observed quantity demanded, and η  is the elasticity of 
demand.   
 
 
4.2.2  Demand: Two-good Model 
 
We expand the one-good model to represent the demand for white meat and dark meat in the 
two-good model. Since white and dark chicken meat can be considered substitutes
2, the demand 



































− − =   (4) 
 
where  white D  is the domestic demand for white chicken meat, Pw is the domestic price of white 










ψ = , white Qd   is the observed quantity 
demanded of white meat,  w η   is the own-price elasticity of demand,  white P   is the observed  
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wholesale price of white meat
3, and  wd η  is the cross-price elasticity of demand for white meat 
with respect to the price of dark meat.  Dark meat variables are defined using the same 















Constructing simulation models for supply-managed industries is complicated by the lack of 
observable price and quantity combinations from which a supply function can be derived - output 
and price combinations are not determined by the intersection of demand and supply. However, 
it is possible to construct a supply function if the departure from marginal-cost pricing (that 
would exist in a competitive industry) can be determined from the values of production quotas 
(Moschini and Meilke, 1991). A supply function can be fitted through the observed output and 







P  (5) 
 
where S  is the domestic supply, P  is the domestic price,  ) ( ε α − = 1 Qs , 
Mc
Qs ε
β = , Qs  is the 
observed quantity supplied,  c M  is the implied marginal cost, and ε  is the elasticity of supply. 
The implied marginal cost,  c M , is not observable, and is estimated using production quota 
values.  The following formula is used to derive the implied marginal cost: 
 
Qr P M farm c − =  (6) 
 
where  c M  is the marginal cost at the competitive level,  farm P  is the price paid to producers at the 
farm gate reported by CFC, and Qr is the rental value of production quota. Because production 
quota is a valuable asset, the rental value of production quota can be estimated using the 
capitalization formula




= λ  (7) 
 
where λ  is the discount rate, Qr  is the rental value of production quota (measured in kg of 
eviscerated meat), and Qv  is the asset value or capital value of production quota (C$/12 kg of 
live weight). The rental value of production quota can be estimated with the observed capital 
values of production quotas and an assumed discount rate
5. Table 4.3 presents the marginal cost 
values






Table 2: Marginal cost  
 
Year Capital  value 
of quota (C$) 
Rental value of quota (C$) 
7%          10%        13% 
Farm 
Price (C$) 
Marginal cost (C$) 
7%           10%          13% 
2004  52.57  0.42  0.59  0.77  1.66  1.24 1.06 0.88 
2005  53.97  0.43  0.61  0.79  1.62  1.19 1.01 0.83 
2006  56.51  0.45  0.64  0.83  1.55  1.10 0.91 0.72 
2007  57.63  0.46  0.65  0.85  1.73  1.28 1.08 0.89 
Average  55.17  0.44  0.62  0.81  1.64  1.20 1.02 0.83 
Sources: Capital Value of one unit of production quota (C$/12 kg live weight) from CFO (2007).  
  Rental value of production quota is equal to the capital value of quota (C$/kg) multiplied by the producers’ 
discount rate. Marginal cost price is equal to farm price less the rental value of production quota. 
 
 
4.2.4  Supply When Producers are Risk Averse 
 
Unstable world chicken prices could expose the Canadian chicken market to volatile imports if 
over-quota tariffs drop significantly. Because price and income stability are two of the key 
objectives of supply managed policies, it is important to consider how producers would respond 
to higher levels of risk after the implementation of a liberalising trade agreement.  We assume 
that producers are risk averse (Gunjal and Legault, 1995), and modify the supply function from 
equation (5) with a risk premium






+ − = S
1
P  (8) 
 
where  ) ( ε ϕ − = 1 Qs , 
c M
Qs ε
θ = , S  is the farm supply, P is the expected marginal cost, and ρ  is 
the risk premium. The risk premium is calculated as: 
 
S * * CARA
2 σ ρ =  (9) 
 
where CARA is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion, 
2 σ  is the variance of producer’s price, 
and S  is farm supply. The variance of the producer’s price is taken from the normal probability 





CARA =  (10) 
 
where CRRA  is the coefficient of relative risk aversion and π  is the baseline level of producer 
surplus.  We use a CRRA of 4, taken from the OECD (2004). 
 
The baseline scenarios for the one- and two-good models are used to calculate welfare measures 
in the Canadian chicken market under the current TRQ regime. These baselines serve as starting 
points from which to calculate the distribution of welfare following trade liberalisation, and  
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when international prices are modelled stochastically. The analysis is done at the wholesale 




4.3  Latest WTO Draft Modalities 
 
The latest draft modalities to emerge from DDA negotiations (WTO, 2008) propose cuts to  tariff 
rates on agricultural products according to a tiered formula in which higher tariffs (out-of-quota 
tariffs) would have to be cut more than relatively lower tariffs. Developed and developing 
country members would have different thresholds and tariff reductions. For developed countries, 
tariffs below 20% are to be cut by 50% and tariffs above 75% are to cut by 70%. All lower 
bound tariffs (in-quota tariffs) would be reduced either by 50% or to 10%, whichever results in a 
lower tariff. Where the in-quota tariff rate is already bound at or below 5%, it should be reduced 
to zero at the end of the first year of the implementation period (WTO, 2008).  
 
 
4.3.1 Sensitive  Products 
 
The latest draft modalities (WTO, 2008) include proposals that would allow member countries to 
categorise products as sensitive for domestic political reasons. Developed countries would be 
able to designate 4-6% of their products as sensitive, or 6-8% of products if more than 30% of 
their products are in the top band of the tariff formula (WTO, 2008). Tariffs on products that are 
designated as sensitive may be cut by one-third, one-half or two-thirds of the reduction that 
would otherwise be required by the tiered reduction formula. To compensate for these smaller 
tariff cuts, member countries must expand the level of import quotas at the lower tariff rate (in-
quota tariff). For developed countries, if the minimum deviation from the tiered reduction 
formula (one-third) is selected, then the minimum import quota expansion should be 3-5% of 
domestic consumption. If the maximum deviation from the tiered reduction formula (two-thirds) 
is selected, then the minimum import quota expansion should be 4-6% of domestic consumption 
(WTO, 2008). Although these numbers are still under negotiation, they represent the best 
estimates of the possible consensus, should the current framework be accepted as a modalities 
package. 
 
Canada’s supply managed industries enjoy very strong political support (House of Commons, 
2009), and it is likely that chicken would be considered sensitive in the implementation of a 
DDA agreement.  We incorporate trade liberalisation scenarios into the model under the 
assumption that chicken will be categorised as sensitive, and will therefore be subject to 
relatively modest tariff rate reductions. 
 
 
4.4  TRQ Liberalization with Supply Management 
 
According to the latest draft modalities (WTO, 2008), the Canadian in-quota tariff for chicken 
products would be reduced to zero percent. The elimination of the in-quota tariff may or may not 
change market access, depending on whether the import quota is binding. That is, if the import  
9 
quota is already filled, then a lower tariff rate would not increase the flow of chicken imports 
into Canada.  The import quota rate fill for Canadian chicken industry is currently above 100% 
(CFC, 2007), which means that the import quota is binding and the elimination of the in-quota 
tariff would not affect import volumes. However, if the world price is below the domestic price 
then the elimination of the in-quota tariff would reduce domestic prices as cheaper imports enter 
the Canadian market. The in-quota tariff for chicken under NAFTA is zero percent, and because 
the US is the largest foreign supplier of chicken products to Canada (approximately 85% of total 
chicken imports in 2008 (USDA, 2009)), the elimination of the in-quota tariff may not have a 
significant effect on domestic prices or producer's revenue.  
 
The current over-quota tariff for Canadian chicken products is 238%, and the proposed DDA 
tariff cut for this category is 70%. However Canada’s supply managed industries are likely to 
receive sensitive product designation, and WTO members may deviate from the tiered reduction 
formula in such cases.  The current DDA proposals allow member countries to deviate from the 
70% cut by one-third, one-half or two-thirds. We assume that the maximum deviation is applied 
to Canadian chicken imports, which means that the over-quota tariff would be reduced from 
238% to 182.5%, and the import quota level would be set at 10% of domestic consumption
8.  
 
It is necessary to calculate how much the over-quota tariff can be reduced without allowing out-
of-quota imports into Canada in order to determine if the over-quota tariff reduction would have 
an effect on the Canadian chicken market. If the cut to the over-quota tariff rate does not reduce 
the rate below prohibitive levels, then market access would not increase above the quota level.  
We calculate the water in the tariff (WIT) by measuring the difference between the over-quota 
tariff rate and the nominal rate of protection (NRP) (Martin and Wang, 2004; Barichello and 












=    (11) 
 
where  Pc   is the Canadian wholesale price of chicken, 
cif
world P   is the landed-price of chicken 
including insurance and freight, and 
fob
world P  is the world free-on-board price of chicken.  The WIT 
is defined as: 
 
NRP T WIT − =   (12) 
 
where T is the applied over-quota tariff rate.   
 
If the wholesale price (Pc) used to calculate the NRP is not at the competitive level, then the 
WIT may not be an accurate representation of how much the over-quota tariff can be reduced 
without affecting the Canadian chicken market (Barichello and Zhang, 2008).  If the over-quota 
tariff if reduced beyond the WIT but less than the potential WIT, then imports over the minimum 
access level could still be restricted if the CFC increases output and the domestic wholesale price 
falls towards competitive levels. We estimate a counterfactual competitive wholesale price for 
the Canadian chicken market to account for this consideration. The wholesale price (Pc) under a 
supply-managed industry can be expressed as:   
10 
world P
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margin farm P P Pc + =  (13) 
 
where  farm P   is the producers’ price of chicken at the farm-level (under the supply-managed 
industry), and  margin P  is the processing margin, which is assumed to be constant. The farm price 
(equation 6) is equal to the marginal cost price (producers’ price at the competitive level) plus 
the rental value of production quota (Qr). Then, the wholesale price in a perfectly competitive 
market can be represented as:  
 
margin P Mc Pc + =
*   (14) 
 
where 
* Pc  is the counterfactual Canadian wholesale price at the competitive level, Mc  is the 
marginal cost, and  margin P  is the processing margin. Figure 4 shows a situation in which the over-
quota tariff is reduced from  0 T  to  1 T , and  WIT T T > − 1 0 . In this case, chicken imports would 
enter the Canadian market because the landed-price (world price plus the applicable over-quota 
tariff) is less than the domestic price ( Pc T 1 P world < + ) ( 1 ). However, if the WIT is calculated with 
the Canadian wholesale price described by equation (14), then the landed price would be greater 
than the domestic price (
*
1) ( Pc T 1 P world > + ), and no imports would enter the Canadian market.  
 
 

















Source: Barichello and Zhang (2008) 
 
 
The potential NRP (the NRP calculated at 

















* Pc  is the domestic wholesale price at the competitive level,  
cif
world P  is the landed price 
without a tariff, and 
fob
world P  is the free-on-board world price as (Barichello and Zhang, 2008). The 
corresponding potential WIT is defined as: 
 
Potential Potential NRP T WIT − =  (16) 
 
where T  is the applied over-quota tariff rate and  potential NRP  is the potential NRP calculated by 
equation (15).  This potential WIT provides a more accurate estimate of how much the over-
quota tariff can be reduced while still restricting over-quota access of imported chicken into 
Canada.  We model both the WIT  and the  potential WIT  in our simulations for comparison. 
 
5.0  WELFARE AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
We generate two baseline models; one with, and one without, price risk.  Two versions of each 
baseline model are presented: one in which chicken is assumed to be a single homogenous 
product, and a second less restrictive version in which chicken is modelled as two distinct 
products.  
 
5.1 One-good  Model 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the three stages of the chicken supply chain that are modelling in this 
research.  Production controls are applied at the farm level, international trade occurs at the 
wholesale/processing level and final consumption is modelled at the retail level. The retail-level 
demand function (Dr ) represents demand for chicken products by consumers and  retail P  is the 
retail price. The demand facing processors is represented by the wholesale-level demand 
function (Dw), which is obtained by subtracting the marginal cost of marketing services from 
the retail demand function ( Dr ). The wholesale price ( wholesale P ) is paid to processors from 
retailers. The farm-level demand function (Df ) represents demand facing producers, which is 
obtained by subtracting the marginal cost of processing services from the wholesale demand 
function (Dw). The marginal cost function (MC ) represents the supply of chicken at the farm-
level. The farm price ( farm P ) is the price paid to producers at the farm gate and marginal cost 
( c M ) is found using the rental value of production quota.  
 
In order to simulate a range of trade scenarios in a supply-managed industry, we must make a 
behavioural assumption on the part of the supply management authority, i.e., the CFC. If the 
marketing board acts as a pure monopolist, then output is set where marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. However, given that the demand for chicken is inelastic, the marginal revenue 
received by the monopolist at this point would be negative (Rude and Gervais, 2006)
9. Also, the 
monopoly solution (as inferred from setting output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue) 
results in a smaller level of output than currently observed production quota. This suggests that 
the production quota is not set at the profit-maximizing level. Following Rude and Gervais 
(2006), we assume that the marketing board behaves as a constrained monopolist in which the  
12 
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marketing board’s quota decision is inhibited by the price elasticity of demand for chicken. We 
incorporate this into the model by calibrating an adjusted marginal revenue function to intersect 
the marginal cost (MC ) curve at the initial level of production (
0 Qs ). We introduce the TRQ to 
the model by applying an import quota (L) at the wholesale level.  Domestic quantity demanded 
(Qd ) is the sum of the production quota (Qs) and the volume of imports (L). Imports enter the 
Canadian market at the world price ( world P ).  
 
 






































Producer surplus is measured as the difference between producer revenue (price at the farm level 
multiplied by domestic supply), and the area under the marginal cost curve between the intercept 
and the level of domestic supply. Processor revenue is calculated as the difference between the 
wholesale price and the farm price of chicken multiplied by the level of domestic supply. 
Consumer surplus is an aggregated value that includes the processor, retailer, and consumer 
surplus. It is calculated as the difference between the retail price and the wholesale price, 
multiplied by the level of domestic consumption, plus the area under the retail demand function 
up to the retail price.  
 
Import quota rents are calculated as the difference between the wholesale price and the world 
price multiplied by the volume of imports. The import quota level for 2007 was calculated as 73 
million kg; however, the volume of imports that year was 152 million kg (CFC 2007). The 
volume of Canadian chicken imports is above the minimum market access due to supplementary 
imports under the “import-to-re-export” program, which allows imports of chicken and chicken 
products into Canada to be further processed with the restriction that all imports under this 
program be exported within a six-month period.  
 
Import data include imports under the “import to re-export” program and imports that are not 
subject to TRQs (e.g. imports of non-ICL products). Seventy-four million kg of chicken were 
imported under the “import to re-export” program in 2007 (CFC, 2007). According to the latest 
draft modalities (WTO, 2008), imports to re-export (including where the obligation to re-export 
is in a processed form) should not be counted as imports in our model under the minimum 
market access commitment. Therefore, the initial level of imports is calculated as 7.5% of 
production (the value of the current minimum access level) in order to compare the increased 
market access from 7.5% of domestic production to 10% of domestic consumption under the 
DDA proposals. Total industry welfare is calculated as the sum of producer surplus, consumer 
surplus, processor revenue, and import quota rents. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the effects of import quota expansion on the Canadian chicken market. The 
production quota is set by assuming that the marketing board acts as a constrained monopolist, 
and faces  TRQ Df −   as its effective demand. The producers’ residual demand function 
( TRQ Df − ) and its corresponding marginal revenue function ( TRQ MR− ) shift downward due 
to the increase in market access. As a result, the level of domestic supply goes down from 
0 Qs  
to 
1 Qs , farm price declines from 
0
farm P  to 
1
farm P , and marginal cost decreases from 
0
c M  to 
1
c M . 
Since more low-priced foreign chicken enters the Canadian market, the domestic wholesale price 
decreases from 
0
wholesale P  to 
1
wholesale P  and domestic consumption increases from 
0 Qd  to 
1 Qd .  
 
The change in producer surplus consists of two areas: the rectangle  jl Pfarm
01
farm P , which is the 
loss associated with lower farm price, and the trapezoid lkon representing the loss due to lower 
domestic supply. The change in import quota rents consist of three areas: the rectangle abed  that 
is lost due to a lower wholesale price, the area  ] [ * ] [
0 1 1 Qd Qd P P world wholesale − − , representing the 
gain due to higher domestic demand, and the area cdfg , which is the gain attributed to lower 
domestic supply.   
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wholesale adP  represents 
the loss associated with a lower wholesale price, the area cdlk  that is the loss owing to lower 




farm ikP  indicating the gain generated by lower farm price. 
 
The change in consumer surplus consists of three areas: the trianglestu , which is the gain due to 
a lower retail price, the area  ] [ * ] [
0 1 1 1 Qd Qd P P wholesale retail − −   representing the gain associated 




wholesale beP   that is attributable to a lower 
wholesale price. 
 
The welfare analysis when world prices are stochastic considers a marginal cost curve that is 
adjusted for a risk premium ( Risk MC ), as described by equation (8), and assumes that chicken 
producers are risk averse. The introduction of the risk premium increases the slope of the 
marginal cost function. Import quota rents, processor revenue, and consumer surplus measures 
are calculated as described above.  The change in producer surplus includes the losses associated 
with lower farm price and lower domestic supply and the loss associated with the risk premium 
that induced the shift in the marginal cost function. 
 
 
5.2 Two-good  Model 
 
The pattern of consumption and trade of chicken in Canada suggests that consumers do not view 
chicken as a single homogeneous good. We therefore relax the assumption that chicken is a 
single homogenous product and simulate the model for two distinct products.  All surplus 
calculations are performed in the same manner as described for the one-good model, however 
demand and supply functions are derived for each product (dark and white meat) individually 
and surplus measures are derived in each product market
10.  The mechanical process described in 
section 4.1 is used to disaggregate chicken into white and dark meat.  
 
Approximately 70% of chicken imports into Canada are white meat (AAFC, 2008), so enhanced 
market access would likely lead to increased flows of white (instead of dark) meat imports.  If 
larger import volumes depress the domestic price of white meat, then domestic suppliers would 
respond by cutting quantity supplied.  This would necessarily reduce dark meat production 
because white and dark chicken meat is produced and sold as a single product at the farm level.  
The reduction in dark meat supply could cause an increase in the price for dark meat.  Also, since 
white and dark chicken meats are substitute products, lower white meat prices would decrease 
demand for dark meat.   
 
 
5.3 Sensitivity  Analysis 
 
The parameters used in this research are taken from previous studies that use a range of different 
data sources and methodologies.  We conduct sensitivity analyses to identify the most sensitive 
parameters used in the simulation model. 
  
15 
The discount rate is used to calculate the rental value of production quota, which is then used to 
estimate the marginal cost of Canadian chicken production in a perfectly competitive market. We 
simulate the model over a range of discount rates to evaluate how much more productive 
Canadian chicken producers would have to be for welfare to increase if enhanced market access 
increases the flow of imports into Canada.  
 
We also conduct sensitivity analysis on the elasticity of chicken supply. The baseline supply 
elasticity is drawn from an estimate of US long-run broiler supply. Due to supply restrictions at 
the farm-level, Canadian chicken supply response may be more elastic than US supply response 
(Chavas, 1978). The supply functions (equations 5 and 8) are calibrated over a range of supply 
elasticities of 0.6, 0.8, and 1.0.  
 
We also undertake a set of sensitivity analyses of the own- and cross-price elasticities of demand 
for white and dark meats to determine the sensitivity of our results to these parameter that are 
drawn from different sources (Goddard et al. 2007 and Thompson et al. 2008).  
 
 
6.0  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The welfare effects of TRQ liberalization on the Canadian chicken market for the one-good 
model are displayed in table 3. The second column contains observed data that are used to 
calibrate the model and calculate baseline welfare measures against which liberalisation 
scenarios are compared. Column three presents the welfare results after simulating an increase in 
the volume of the import quota.  The expansion of the import quota leads to a reduction in 
domestic supply by 10 million kg, and the resultant marginal cost and farm price fall from 
C$1.02 to C$1.00 and from C$1.64 to C$1.62 respectively. Owing to lower domestic prices and 
supply, producer surplus declines by C$21 million. The wholesale price of chicken decreases 
from C$2.95 to C$2.93, and domestic consumption increases by 4 million kg.  The combination 
of lower prices and higher consumption generates an increase of C$28 million in consumer 
surplus. The net effect is a gain in welfare of C$7 million in the Canadian chicken market.  
 
Increased market access would amplify the Canadian chicken market’s exposure to world price 
volatility. Column four introduces price risk into the model, as defined by equation (8).  The 
results in column four represent the baseline in which liberalisation has not taken place - these 
results are then compared to liberalisation scenarios that include price risk.  The most notable 
difference between the two base scenarios (columns two and four) is the increase in marginal 
cost from C$1.02 to C$1.23. Under price risk, the supply function adjusted for the risk premium 
is steeper than without risk, leading to markedly higher marginal costs.  Consumer surplus and 
processor revenue for the two base scenarios are the same. Producer surplus is lower when 
producers are risk averse and world price risk is introduced into the model. Import quota rents 
have higher values in the base scenario with price risk than in the base scenario without risk. The 
loss in producer surplus outweighs the gain in import quota rents; therefore, total welfare is 
lower with price risk than without.  
 
The fifth column of table 3 reports the results of quota liberalization when world prices are 
stochastic and the farm-level supply function incorporates a risk premium. Import quota rents  
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increase due to the lower world price after liberalisation. The change in processor revenue and 
consumer surplus is the same for the two scenarios (with and without risk) because the risk 
premium does not affect the demand functions and because marketing margins are constant. A 
risk-normal simulation model is performed using the risk-analysis software @RISK to generate 
the 5
th and 95
th percentile values for the world price. Producer surplus fluctuates from C$609 
million to C$1144 million, and consumer surplus varies from C$6270 million to C$4270 million.  
Processor revenue is not affected by price risk because of the assumption of constant processing 
costs. Note that if world prices approached $2.13, as indicated in the 5
th percentile column, 
chicken imports would surge were it not for the prohibitively high over-quota tariff rate.  Welfare 
in the chicken industry is affected by price risk, but the TRQ system provides insulation from 
volatile world prices.  
 
Table 3: Welfare effects on the Canadian chicken market: one-good model 
 






Quota Expansion & 
Price Risk   5
th     95
th 
Wholesale price   2.95  2.93  2.95  2.93  2.13  3.85 
World price   1.93  1.93  1.89  1.75  0.94  2.66 
Retail price   5.35  5.34  5.35  5.34  4.54  6.26 
Farm price   1.64  1.62  1.64  1.62  1.21  1.83 
Marginal cost   1.02  1.00  1.23  1.21  1.21  1.21 
Consumption 941  945  941  945  945  739 
Imports   73.1  86.5  73.1  86.5  86.5  0.00 
Domestic Supply   868  858  868  858  858  858 
Import quota rents   74  86  87  102  103  0.00 
Producer surplus   1070  1051  981  964  609  1144 
Processor revenue   1134  1121  1134  1121  792  1730 
Consumer surplus   5866  5894  5866  5894  6270  4270 
Total welfare   8145  8152  8069  8081  7775  7144 
Prices: C$/kg eviscerated weight, Consumption, imports, and domestic supply: 000,000 kg; Producer revenue, 
import quota rents, producer surplus, processor revenue, consumer surplus, and total welfare: C$ millions 
 
We next calculate the water in the tariff (WIT) in order to determine if cuts to the over-quota 
tariff rate would affect chicken imports. The results of these calculations are found in table 4.  
We find that imports would only increase if the over-quota tariff is reduced by more than 182.66 
percentage points (i.e. the new over quota tariff rate is lower than 55.34%) - any cut to over-
quota tariff rates below that would leave landed prices uncompetitive.  The latest DDA draft 
modalities (WTO, 2008) propose a cut of only 23.3%, which would bring the over-quota tariff 
rate down from 238% to 182%. This new over-quota tariff would still be prohibitive, which 
means that no imports over the minimum market access commitments would enter the Canadian 
market. Consequently, there is no liberalising effect due to the reduction of the over-quota tariff. 
The potential WIT, which is calculated with a counterfactual domestic wholesale price of 
chicken at the competitive level, tells us that if the over-quota tariff is reduced beyond 182.66 but 
less than 216.68 percentage points, then out-of-quota imports would not enter the Canadian 
market. However, domestic prices would have to be reduced towards competitive levels in order 
to render imports uncompetitive. 
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The NRP and the WIT are also calculated in the context of stochastic world prices. The 5
th and 
95
th values are reported in table 4. A fall in the world price of chicken would allow out-of-quota 
imports into Canada if there were no WIT (i.e. the NRP and the over-quota tariff are equal). If 
the lower end of the probability distribution of the world price is below the domestic price, then 
an assumption about the marketing board production decision would have to be made (e.g. the 
marketing board could increase production to compensate for the loss associated with lower 
domestic prices). However, given that there is water in the over-quota tariff (even at the 5% level 
of the probability distribution), it is unlikely that the landed price would be below the domestic 
price. According to table 4, the current over-quota tariff has a WIT of 182.66%; therefore, flows 
of over access imports into Canada caused by a decrease in the world price are not anticipated. 
The only effect of tariff liberalisation is the reduction in the WIT. The new WIT and potential 
WIT after the over-quota tariff reduction are shown in table 4.  
 
Table 4: Water and potential water in the tariff  
 
  NRP  WIT  Potential NRP  Potential WIT 
Over-quota tariff (238%)  55.34 182.66  21.32  216.68 
Price risk  71.21 166.79  33.53  204.47 
5 percentile  142.51  95.49  68.19  169.81 
95 percentile  46.40  191.60  22.08  215.92 
Over-quota tariff (182%)  55.34 127.21  21.32  161.22 
All values in percent 
 
The results of the simulation model after disaggregating chicken into two distinct products are 
presented in table 5. In the case of white chicken meat, the most significant difference between 
the baselines of the one-good model and the two-good model is the level of consumer surplus. 
The demand function for white meat is considerably steeper than the demand function for 
chicken (measured as a single product); as a result, consumer surplus is larger for white meat. 
Chicken is produced and sold as a single product at the farm level, and production is represented 
by a single supply function. Therefore producer surplus is the same in the two-good model as in 
the one-good model.  
 
Larger flows of white meat imports pushes the domestic price of white meat down from C$4.91 
to C$4.88, and consumption increases accordingly. Since white and dark meats are substitutes, 
consumption of dark meat decreases. Lower quantity supplied for dark meat as a result of lower 
domestic production increases its price from C$1.99 to C$2.00. The effect of quota liberalisation 
on processor revenue and consumer surplus is the same with or without price risk. However, 
producer surplus and import quota rents, as in the one-good case, are reduced by larger amounts 
when price risk is included in the model. The last two columns of table 5 report the 5
th and 95
th 
percentile values of the simulation model for stochastic world prices. Producer surplus fluctuates 
from C$336 million to C$643 million, and consumer surplus varies from C$8698 million to 
C$7853 million.  
 
The demand function for dark meat is to the left of both the demand function for white meat and 
the demand function for chicken as an aggregated product. Therefore, consumer surplus for dark 
meat is smaller. Table 5 reports that quota liberalisation decreases consumer surplus for dark  
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meat from C$1454 million to C$1444 due to lower consumption. The overall welfare effect of 
quota liberalisation is negative for dark meat. 
 









Quota Expansion &  
Price Risk   5
th       95
th 
Wholesale price of white meat  4.91  4.88  4.91  4.88  3.32  6.31 
Wholesale price of dark meat  1.99  2.00  1.99  2.00  1.26  2.73 
World price of white meat  2.47  2.47  2.65  2.64  1.29  4.22 
World price of dark meat  1.34  1.34  1.34  1.35  0.62  2.11 
Retail price of white meat  14.83  14.8  14.8  14.8  13.2  16.2 
Retail price of dark meat  4.54  4.55  4.54  4.55  3.81  5.28 
White Meat           
Consumption    559  564  559  564 564 339 
Imports    60.7  71.8  60.7  71.8 71.8 0.0 
Domestic Supply   498  493  498  493  493  493 
Import quota rents   148  173  138  161  30  0 
Producer  surplus    614  603  563  554 336 643 
Processor  revenue    1629  1602  1629  1602 1037 2206 
Consumer  surplus    8167  8258  8167  8258 8698 7853 
Total welfare   10558  10637  10497  10575  10102  10702 
Dark Meat           
Consumption    383  380  383  380.3 380.3 305 
Imports    12.4  14.7  12.4  14.7 14.7 0.0 
Domestic Supply   370  366  370  366  366  366 
Import quota rents   8  10  8  9  9  0.0 
Producer  surplus    456  448  418  411 259 487 
Processor revenue   132  138  132  138  17  327 
Consumer  surplus    1454  1444  1454  1444 1585 1305 
Total welfare   2050  2039  2012  2002  1870  2120 
Total for two-good model           
Consumption    941  945  941  945 945 644 
Imports    73.1  86.5  73.1  86.5 86.5 0.0 
Domestic Supply   868  858  868  858  858  858 
Import quota rents  156  183  146  170  39  0.0 
Producer  surplus    1070  1051  981  964 596 1131 
Processor  revenue    1761  1740  1761  1740 1054 2533 
Consumer surplus   9621  9701  9620  9701  10284  9158 
Total welfare   12608  12675  12508  12576  11972  12822 
Prices (C$/kg eviscerated); consumption, imports, and domestic supply (000,000 kg); producer revenue, import 
quota rents, producer surplus, processor revenue, consumer surplus, and total welfare (C$ millions) 
 
The aggregated results of the two-good model are presented in the bottom section of table 5 - 
these figures are calculated by adding the white and dark meat effects together. A comparison of 
the one-good model results to the two-good model results are in table 6.  The second and third 
columns report the changes with respect to the base scenario, and the last two columns report the  
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changes with respect to the price-risk base scenario. Import quota rents increase in all cases after 
trade liberalisation due to the increase in imports and lower domestic prices, but the increase is 
higher in the two-good model due to a larger gap between the domestic and the world price of 
white meat. Producer surplus decreases in both models by the same amount, but the decrease is 
smaller when producers are risk averse than when they are risk neutral. The decrease in 
processor revenue is larger in the two-good model due to a larger fall of the domestic prices of 
white meat. Consumer surplus is significantly higher in the two-good model because of different 
white and dark meat demand functions. Trade liberalisation increases total welfare in both 
models, but the increase is larger when price risk is included in the model. 
 
Table 6: Welfare effects: one-good model vs. two-good model 
 










Δ Import quota rents   12.28 26.32  14.67  24.41 
Δ Producer surplus   -19.00 -19.00  -16.88  -16.88 
Δ Processor revenue  -13.16 -20.98  -13.16  -20.98 
Δ Consumer surplus    27.51   81.25   27.51   81.25 
Δ Total welfare     7.63   67.59   12.14   67.80 
All values are changes: C$ millions 
 
6.1 Discussion  of  Results 
 
We can draw a number of conclusions from the results of the simulations performed in this 
research.  First, the current over-quota tariff rate is so high that DDA proposals to cut over-quota 
tariff rates would not enhance market access.  The proposed 23.3% cut (for sensitive products 
using the two-thirds deviation formula) would leave a large amount of WIT, and there would be 
no liberalising effect.  Even if world prices are modelled stochastically, it is unlikely that lower 
world prices could generate flows of out-of-quota imports into Canada. If the over-quota tariff is 
reduced beyond the WIT (currently 180%), but less than the potential WIT, then out-of-quota 
imports would not enter the Canadian market if domestic prices are reduced to approach 
competitive levels. Such a reduction in domestic prices could affect the Canadian chicken 
market, but is not modelled in this paper. 
 
Second, estimated welfare implications are different between the model that treats chicken as a 
single product and the model that differentiates by cut. The Canadian chicken market is 
predominantly a white meat market, and most imports are white cuts. Consequently, an increase 
in the volume of low-priced foreign chicken imports would primarily affect the domestic 
wholesale price of white meat. The results of the welfare analysis show that there is a 
redistribution of welfare among import quota-rent holders, processors, and consumers between 
the two models. Therefore, the representation of chicken as differentiated products is an 
important consideration when modelling the Canadian chicken market.  We view the model that 
disaggregates chicken by cut as more general and less restrictive (in that we do not impose the 
restriction that chicken is a single product), and therefore believe that the results from this model 
are more representative of potential trade liberalising effects.  
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One of the core objectives of a supply-managed system is price stability, so it is important to 
consider how liberalised trade would affect the industry’s exposure to volatile world prices.  Our 
results show that the liberalisation-induced welfare increase is larger when world prices are 
modelled stochastically. It is important to note that the risk premium used in this research may 
overstate the effects of price risk because it is derived from observations on relatively volatile 
world prices. The effects of world price fluctuations would only transmitted completely to 
Canadian producers if all tariffs are removed. However, imports are still subject to TRQs 
(although the import quota is expanded), and there is no trade liberalising effect due to over-
quota tariff reduction. Domestic producers are insulated from domestic price volatility as long as 
there are trade barriers in place.  The risk faced by Canadian producers is likely smaller than the 
estimates used in this research.   
 
Current DDA proposals for liberalising the TRQs that currently protect Canada’s chicken 
industry are modest.  The reduction in the over-quota tariff would be small and the increase in 
market access would be relatively small.  As a result, the overall welfare implications for 
Canada’s chicken industry are modest.  The welfare implications along the chicken supply chain 
can be briefly summarised as follows. The expansion of the import quota allows more low-priced 
imports of chicken products into Canada, thereby reducing domestic prices. Lower domestic 
prices induce consumption, and consumer surplus increases. Processors would experience two 
opposing effects of liberalisation: they would benefit from lower domestic prices and increased 
consumption, but processor revenue would decrease because production declines. Domestic 
supply is partially displaced by increased imports and producer surplus declines with 
liberalisation. The increase in consumer surplus and import quota rents outweighs the loss in 
producer surplus and processor revenue; as a result, total welfare increases. The overall welfare 
effects of trade liberalisation in Canada’s chicken industry are positive.  
 
Finally, the importance of the sensitive product designation cannot be overstated.  Canada’s 
supply-managed industries receive strong political support (House of Commons, 2009) and it 
appears as though Canada’s chicken industry would be categorised as sensitive in the 
implementation of a DDA agreement.  This means that the TRQs that limit Canadian imports 
would not be subjected to the same disciplines as other agricultural products.  The simulations in 
this research are based on the modest disciplines that would be applied to sensitive products.  If 
chicken were not to receive the sensitive product designation, then tariff rates would have to be 
cut substantially and market access would increase far beyond the scenarios in this research.   
 
We conduct a range of sensitivity analyses on the parameters that form the foundation of the 
simulation model in this research.  These parameters include the producer discount rates, the 
supply elasticity, and the own and cross price elasticities of demand for white and dark meats.  
The results of these analyses are presented in the appendix II.  We provide just a brief 
explanation of the sensitivity analyses here. 
 
Welfare measures are sensitive to the discount rate, which is used to estimate the marginal cost 
in a competitive market.  Specifically, a lower initial marginal cost obtained with a higher 
discount rate significantly increases the level of producer surplus. A higher discount rate implies  
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higher productivity and suggests that the effects of trade liberalisation on Canadian producers 
would be smaller. 
 
The effects of trade liberalisation on Canadian producers are smaller as their supply response 
increases because producers can adjust more easily to the increase of low-priced foreign chicken 
imports. However, a more elastic supply function decreases the base level of producer surplus 
and makes the difference between risk-neutral and risk-averse producers more significant. The 
sensitivity analysis with respect to the price elasticities of demand for white and dark meats 
demonstrates that a more inelastic demand for each type of meat increases the level of consumer 
surplus, thereby increasing total welfare (only the dark meat case is shown in the appendix II).  
 
 
7.0 CONCLUDING  REMARKS 
 
Canada’s chicken producers have relied on a system of TRQs to protect them from foreign 
competition since the implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture in 1995.  
The current DDA negotiations include proposals that would reduce the level of protection that is 
provided by existing chicken TRQs.  We develop a partial-equilibrium simulation model to 
evaluate the effects of current proposals on Canada’s chicken industry. 
 
Our simulations show that the effects of proposed TRQ liberalisation on Canada’s chicken 
industry would be modest.  Chicken is likely to be treated as a sensitive product in the 
implementation of a DDA agreement, and the required reforms to existing TRQs would not lead 
to large increases in chicken imports.  The over-quota tariff would remain prohibitive after the 
proposed cuts, and the increase in the minimum access commitment would generate a small 
increase in imports.  The net effects on the Canadian chicken market would be positive, with 
gains to consumers outweighing losses to producers.  
 
Our results shed light on two methodological issues in modelling international trade of chicken.  
First, our simulation results are significantly different between models that do not account for 
price risk and models that do incorporate risk.  The inclusion of price risk is particularly relevant 
when modelling supply-managed industries in which production and import controls are 
intended to reduce risk.  Second, the disaggregation of chicken into two distinct products affects 
welfare measures of trade liberalisation.  The disaggregation of chicken into two products relaxes 
the assumption of homogeneity across chicken cuts and leads to a less restrictive model.  We 
believe that such disaggregation should be central to future chicken market analyses.  
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Notes 
                                                 
1  wholesale P  is the average, from 2004 to 2007, wholesale price of chicken (CFC 2009).  
2 Goddard et al. (2007). 
3  white P  and  dark P  are the average, from 2004 to 2007, wholesale price of chicken breast and legs respectively (CFC 
2009). 
4 The capitalization formula measures the ratio between the net operating income produced by an asset (rental value) 
and its capital cost (asset value). 
5 The discount rate is the producer’s expected rate of return (or yield). Sensitivity analysis is conducted over a range 
of discount rates, based on the information of the 10-year period rates of return for poultry farms (AAFC, 2009). 
6 Based on one unit of production quota valued at C$57.63 (representing approximately 12 kg live weight of 
chicken), a conversion value of 0.738 between live and eviscerated weight (CFO 2007), and a discount rate of 10%, 
the rental value of production quota is C$0.65. Then, with a farm price of C$1.73 (converted to kg-eviscerated 
weight, CFC 2007), the marginal cost is C$1.08.  
7 The risk premium is the amount that a risk-averse producer is willing to pay as insurance against risk. 
8 Minimum market access is set at 7.5% of previous year’s domestic production. Canadian chicken consumption 
(1036.9 million kg in 2007) is higher than Canadian chicken production (1003.6 million kg in 2007); therefore 
increasing the import quota level to 10% of previous year’s domestic consumption would increase foreign access. 
9 A monopoly can only maximize profit in the elastic range of the demand function. 
10 In measuring the consumer surplus, for the two-good model, for a simultaneous change in prices, "path 
independence" cannot be assumed, i.e. the measure of the consumer's surplus will vary with the order in which the 
price changes are taken (Mishan E. J., 1977). However, the change in welfare due to price changes, maintaining 
income constant, is shown to be path independent and then a unique measure of consumer surplus is defined as the 
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Good Variable  Variable  Definition  Determination 
Chicken  P   Wholesale price (C$/kg eviscerated)  0 IM S D = − −
Chicken  world P   World price (C$/kg eviscerated)  Exogenous 
Chicken  farm P   Farm price (C$/kg eviscerated)  margin farm P P P − =
Chicken  Qr   Rental value of quota (C$/kg eviscerated)  λ * Qv Qr =
Chicken  Mc   Marginal cost (C$/kg eviscerated)  Qr P Mc farm − =
Chicken  D   Consumption (000,000 kg)  IM S D + =
Chicken  IM   Imports (000,000 kg)  TRQ IM =
Chicken  S   Domestic Supply (000,000 kg)  Mc S * β α + =
White meat  Pw   Wholesale price (C$/kg eviscerated)  0 IM D S white white white = − −
White meat  white
world P   World price (C$/kg eviscerated)  Exogenous 
White meat  white D   Consumption (000,000 kg)  white white white IM S D + =
White meat  white IM   Imports (000,000 kg)  TRQ Sh IM white * =
White meat  white S   Domestic Supply (000,000 kg)  S 0.533 Swhite * =
Dark Meat  Pd   Wholesale price (C$/kg eviscerated)  0 IM D S dark dark dark = − −
Dark Meat  dark
world P   World price (C$/kg eviscerated)  Exogenous 
Dark Meat  dark D   Consumption (000,000 kg)  dark dark dark IM S D + =
Dark Meat  dark IM   Imports (000,000 kg)  TRQ Sh IM dark * =
Dark Meat  dark S   Domestic Supply (000,000 kg)  S 0.467 Sdark * = 
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Appendix II: Sensitivity Analysis  
Table A1: Quota expansion: one-good model 
 
 Variables 
Marginal Cost  Elasticity of Supply 
0.83 C$/kg 
(13% disc. rate) 
1.02 C$/kg 
(10% disc. rate) 
1.2 C$/kg 
(7% disc. rate)  0.6 0.8 1.0 
Wholesale price   2.93  2.93  2.93 2.93  2.93  2.93 
World price   1.93  1.93  1.93 1.93  1.93  1.93 
Retail price   5.34  5.34  5.34 5.33  5.34  5.34 
Farm price   1.63  1.62  1.62 1.62  1.62  1.63 
Marginal cost   0.82  1.00  1.19 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Consumption  944.2  944.7  945.1 945.4  944.7  944.2 
Imports   86.5  86.5  86.5 86.5  86.5  86.5 
Domestic Supply  857.7  858.2  858.6 858.9  858.2  857.7 
Δ Producer revenue   -28.11 -29.16 -30.13 -30.86  -29.16  -28.01 
Δ Import quota rents   12.47 12.28 12.11 11.99  12.28  12.48 
Δ Producer surplus   -19.42 -19.00 -18.62 -21.48  -19.00  -17.31 
Δ Processor revenue   -13.79 -13.16 -12.59 -12.16  -13.16  -13.84 
Δ Consumer surplus   23.52 27.51 31.16 33.90  27.51  23.15 
Δ Total welfare  2.77 7.63 12.07  12.24  7.63  4.48 
Prices: C$/kg eviscerated weight 
Consumption, imports, and domestic supply: 000,000 kg 
Producer revenue, import quota rents, producer surplus, processor revenue, consumer surplus, and total welfare: C$ millions 
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Table A2: Quota expansion and price risk: one-good model 
 
Variables 
Marginal Cost  Elasticity of Supply 
0.83 C$/kg 
(13% disc. rate) 
1.02 C$/kg 
(10% disc. rate) 
1.2 C$/kg 
(7% disc. rate)  0.6 0.8  1.0 
Wholesale price   2.93  2.93  2.93 2.93  2.93  2.93 
World price   1.75  1.75  1.75  1.75 1.75  1.75 
Retail price   5.34  5.34  5.34 5.33  5.34  5.34 
Farm price   1.63  1.62  1.62 1.62  1.62  1.63 
Marginal cost   1.01  1.21  1.41 1.19  1.21  1.23 
Consumption  944.2  944.67  945.11 945.44  944.67  944.2 
Imports   86.5  86.5  86.5 86.5  86.5  86.5 
Domestic Supply  857.7  858.17  858.61 858.94  858.17  857.7 
Δ Producer revenue   -28.11 -29.16 -30.13  -30.86  -29.16  -28.01 
Δ Import quota rents   14.85 14.67 14.50  14.37  14.67  14.87 
Δ Producer surplus   -17.32 -16.88 -16.45  -19.67  -16.88  -14.87 
Δ Processor revenue   -13.79 -13.16 -12.59  -12.16  -13.16  -13.84 
Δ Consumer surplus   23.52 27.51 31.16  33.90  27.51  23.15 
Δ Total welfare  7.26 12.14  16.62  16.44  12.14  9.30 
Prices: C$/kg eviscerated weight 
Consumption, imports, and domestic supply: 000,000 kg 




Table A3: Quota expansion: two-good model, white chicken meat 
 
Variables 
Marginal Cost  Elasticity of Supply 
0.83 C$/kg 
(13% disc. rate) 
1.02 C$/kg 
(10% disc. rate) 
1.2 C$/kg 
(7% disc. rate)  0.6 0.8 1.0 
Wholesale price of white meat  4.88  4.88  4.88 4.87  4.88  4.88 
Wholesale price of dark meat  2.00  2.00  2.00 2.00  2.00  2.00 
World price of white meat  2.47  2.47  2.47 2.47  2.47  2.47 
World price of dark meat  1.34  1.34  1.34 1.34  1.34  1.34 
Retail price of white meat  14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80  14.80  14.80 
Retail price of dark meat  4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55  4.55  4.56 
Wholesale price of chicken  2.93  2.93  2.93 2.93  2.93  2.93 
Retail price of chicken  5.34 5.34 5.34 5.33  5.34  5.34 
Farm price of chicken  1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62  1.62  1.63 
Marginal cost   0.82 1.00 1.19 1.00  1.00  1.00 
Consumption   564.14  564.42  564.67 564.85  564.42  564.12 
Imports   71.82  71.82  71.82 71.82  71.82  71.82 
Domestic Supply   492.32  492.59  492.84 493.03  492.59  492.29 
Δ Producer revenue   -15.67 -16.28 -16.84 -17.25  -16.28  -15.62 
Δ Import quota rents   24.87 24.74 24.62 24.53  24.74  24.88 
Δ Producer surplus   -10.80 -10.59 -10.40 -12.01  -10.59  -9.62 
Δ Processor revenue   -27.95 -26.90 -25.94 -25.22  -26.90  -28.04 
Δ Consumer surplus   86.59 91.12 95.27 98.37  91.12  86.17 
Δ Total welfare   72.71 78.38 83.55 85.67  78.38  73.40 
Prices: C$/kg eviscerated weight 
Consumption, imports, and domestic supply: 000,000 kg 
Producer revenue, import quota rents, producer surplus, processor revenue, consumer surplus, and total welfare: C$ millions 
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Table A4: Quota expansion and price risk: two-good model, white chicken meat 
 
Variables 
Marginal Cost  Elasticity of Supply 
0.83 C$/kg 
(13% disc. rate) 
1.02 C$/kg 
(10% disc. rate) 
1.2 C$/kg 
(7% disc. rate)  0.6 0.8 1.0 
Wholesale price of white meat  4.88  4.88  4.88 4.87  4.88  4.88 
Wholesale price of dark meat  2.00  2.00  2.00 2.00  2.00  2.00 
World price of white meat  2.64 2.64 2.64 2.65  2.65  2.64 
World price of dark meat  1.35 1.35 1.35 1.34  1.34 1.34 
Retail price of white meat  14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80  14.80  14.80 
Retail price of dark meat  4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55  4.55  4.56 
Wholesale price of chicken  2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93  2.93 2.93 
Retail price of chicken  5.34  5.34  5.34  5.33 5.34 5.34 
Farm price of chicken  1.63  1.62  1.62  1.62 1.62 1.63 
Marginal cost   1.01  1.21  1.41  1.19 1.12 1.23 
Consumption   564.14  564.42  564.67 564.85  564.42  564.12 
Imports   71.82  71.82  71.82 71.82  71.82  71.82 
Domestic Supply   492.32  492.59  492.84 493.03  492.59  492.29 
Δ Producer revenue   -15.67  -16.28  -16.84  -17.25 -16.28 -15.62 
Δ Import quota rents   23.00  22.87  22.75  22.66 22.87 23.01 
Δ Producer surplus   -9.63 -9.40 -9.19 -11.00  -9.40  -8.25 
Δ Processor revenue   -27.95  -26.90  -25.94  -25.22 -26.90 -28.04 
Δ Consumer surplus   86.59  91.12  95.27  98.37 91.12 86.17 
Δ Total welfare   72.01  77.69  82.89  84.81 77.69 72.89 
Prices: C$/kg eviscerated weight 
Consumption, imports, and domestic supply: 000,000 kg 
Producer revenue, import quota rents, producer surplus, processor revenue, consumer surplus, and total welfare: C$ millions  
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Table A5: Quota expansion: two-good model, dark chicken meat 
 
Variables 
Marginal Cost  Elasticity of Supply 
0.83 C$/kg 
(13% disc. rate) 
1.02 C$/kg 
(10% disc. rate) 
1.2 C$/kg 
(7% disc. rate)  0.6 0.8 1.0 
Wholesale price of white meat  4.88  4.88  4.88 4.87  4.88  4.88 
Wholesale price of dark meat  2.00  2.00  2.00 2.00  2.00  2.00 
World price of white meat  2.47 2.47 2.47 2.47  2.47 2.47 
World price of dark meat  1.34 1.34 1.34 1.34  1.34 1.34 
Retail price of white meat  14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80  14.80  14.80 
Retail price of dark meat  4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55  4.55  4.56 
Wholesale price of chicken  2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93  2.93 2.93 
Retail price of chicken  5.34 5.34 5.34 5.33  5.34  5.34 
Farm price of chicken  1.62 1.62 1.62 1.62  1.62  1.63 
Marginal cost   0.82  1.00  1.19  1.00 1.00 1.00 
Consumption   380.05  380.26  380.44 380.58  380.26  380.03 
Imports   14.68  14.68  14.68 14.68  14.68  14.68 
Domestic Supply   365.38  365.58  365.77 365.91  365.58  365.36 
Δ Producer revenue   -12.43 -12.88 -13.30 -13.61  -12.88  -12.39 
Δ Import quota rents   1.60 1.58 1.56 1.55  1.58  1.61 
Δ Producer surplus   -8.62 -8.41 -8.22 -9.47  -8.41  -7.69 
Δ Processor revenue   5.62 5.92 6.19 6.39  5.92  5.59 
Δ Consumer surplus   -10.94  -9.88 -8.90 -8.17  -9.88  -11.04 
Δ Total welfare   -12.34 -10.79 -9.37  -9.70  -10.79  -11.53 
Prices: C$/kg eviscerated weight 
Consumption, imports, and domestic supply: 000,000 kg 
Producer revenue, import quota rents, producer surplus, processor revenue, consumer surplus, and total welfare: C$ millions  
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Table A6: Quota expansion and price risk: two-good model, dark chicken meat 
 
Variables 
Marginal Cost  Elasticity of Supply 
0.83 C$/kg 
(13% disc. rate) 
1.02 C$/kg 
(10% disc. rate) 
1.2 C$/kg 
(7% disc. rate)  0.6 0.8 1.0 
Wholesale price of white meat  4.88  4.88  4.88 4.87  4.88  4.88 
Wholesale price of dark meat  2.00  2.00  2.00 2.00  2.00  2.00 
World price of white meat  2.64 2.65 2.64 2.47  2.65  2.65 
World price of dark meat  1.35  1.35 1.35 1.35  1.35  1.35 
Retail price of white meat  14.80 14.80 14.80 14.80  14.80  14.80 
Retail price of dark meat  4.55 4.55 4.55 4.55  4.55  4.56 
Wholesale price of chicken  2.93 2.93 2.93 2.93  2.93 2.93 
Retail price of chicken  5.34 5.34 5.34 5.33  5.34  5.34 
Farm price of chicken  1.63 1.62 1.62 1.62  1.62  1.63 
Marginal cost   1.01  1.12  1.41  1.19 1.12 1.23 
Consumption   380.05  380.26  380.44 380.58  380.26  380.03 
Imports   14.68  14.68  14.68 14.68  14.68  14.68 
Domestic Supply   365.38  365.58  365.77 365.91  365.58  365.36 
Δ Producer revenue   -12.43 -12.88 -13.30 -13.61  -12.88  -12.39 
Δ Import quota rents   1.56 1.54 1.52 1.50  1.54  1.56 
Δ Producer surplus   -7.70 -7.48 -7.27 -8.67  -7.48  -6.62 
Δ Processor revenue   5.62 5.92 6.19 6.39  5.92  5.59 
Δ Consumer surplus   -10.94 -9.88  -8.90  -8.17  -9.88  -11.04 
Δ Total welfare   -11.46 -9.90  -8.46  -8.94  -9.90  -10.50 
Prices: C$/kg eviscerated weight 
Consumption, imports, and domestic supply: 000,000 kg 
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Figure A1: Sensitivity analysis on demand elasticities. Quota expansion and price risk: two-good model, dark chicken meat 
 